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NOTES
BRINGING THE TERRORIST TO JUSTICE:
A DOMESTIC LAW APPROACH
On January 11, 1977, a French court ruled that Abu Daoud, one of the
alleged perpetrators of the 1972 "Munich Massacre," could not be main-
tained under provisional arrest pending possible extradition to West Ger-
many or Israel.1 Daoud's release and his subsequent departure to Algeria,
where he was virtually certain to remain free from prosecution, highlight
the need to reexamine the problem of bringing the international terrorist
to justice.2
The problem is not new.3 Yet, despite long-standing international con-
1. Judgment of Jan. 11, 1977, Chambre d'Accusation de ]a Cour d'appel, Paris (complete
French text on file at the offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal) [hereinafter cited
as the Abu Daoud case]. Excerpts of the opinion in French may be found in 97 GAZETE DU
PALAIS, janvier-f6vrier 1977, at Jurisprudence 105. Excerpts of the opinion in English may
be found in Service de Presse et d'Information, New York, Ambassade de France, Com-
muniqu6 Issued by the French Ministry of Justice Concerning the Release of Abu Daoud
January 11, 1976 [sic], Press Release No. 77/3. For additional factual background on the
Abu Daoud case, see the following issues of the New York Times: Jan. 10, 1977, at 1, col. I;
Jan. 1I, 1977, at 4, col. 3; Jan. 12, 1977, at Al, col. ; Jan. 13, 1977, at 1, col. I; Jan. 14, 1977,
at Al, col. 4; and Note, The Abu Daoud Affair, J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 540-45 (1977).
References will be made to the Abu Daoud case throughout this Note. Only those aspects
of the case involving France and Israel will be discussed. The West German efforts to
guarantee the continued detention of Daoud pending extradition to West Germany failed
because of a procedural technicality not relevant to this Note. For a legal critique of the Abu
Daoud decision dealing with both the West German and Israeli aspects of the case, see:
Rapoport, "Between Minimal Courage and Maximum Cowardice": A LegalAnalysis of the
Release of Abu Daoud, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 195 (1977); Note, supra note 1 at 551-60;
and Rolland, Une itonnante ciliitijudiclaire, Le Monde, Jan. 15, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
2. The terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" will be used throughout this Note but will not
be defined. There is no universally accepted definition of either term. See note 4 infra. For
an exploration of the difficulties inherent in any effort to define these terms, see Jenkins,
International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
WORLD SECURITY 13 (D. Carlton & C. Schaerf eds. 1975).
3. Terrorism was the subject of international concern even before the Second World
War. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938); Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to
International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 431, 433 n.6 (1975). If broadly defined, terrorism can be traced as far back as the
anarchist violence of the late 19th century or the political assassinations of still earlier
periods. Cochard, Le terrorisme et l'extradition en droit beige, in REFLEXaONS SUR LA
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cern, there has been no successful, worldwide response. One factor has
been the absence of international consensus in the area. Countries can
scarcely agree on what a terrorist is, let alone on how to proceed against
him.4 Another difficulty has been the low level of prosecutorial fervor 5 in
what might be referred to as neutral states. 6
Given such difficulties, the most practical solution for bringing terror-
ists to justice would be to strengthen the traditional bilateral extradition
process, thereby assuring the return of terrorists to those states which
have clearly manifested a willingness to prosecute them. This Note will
examine the obstacles to strengthening extradition and will suggest that
DEFINITION ET LA REPRESSION DU TERRORISME 207, 210-16 (1974). A brief historical review of
international responses to terrorism may be found in: David, Le terrorisme en droit interna-
tional, in RiFLEXIONS SUR LA DiFINITION ET LA RiPRESSION DU TERRORISME 105 (1974); and
Paust, supra at 432-44.
4. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). The report groups together various draft
proposals for a treaty on terrorism and illustrates the wide divergence of views on precisely
what activity should be suppressed.
Commentators have set forth a number of interesting proposals for combatting terrorism.
Most, however, depend upon a high degree of multilateral cooperation and would be
unworkable until the lack of consensus on the fundamental nature of the problem is
resolved. See, e.g., Milte, Prevention of Terrorism Through the Development of Supra-
National Criminology, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 519 (1975); Paust, supra note 3. This is not to
say that the field of multilateral cooperation shows no promise at all. Agreement already has
been achieved in certain areas, although usually only where the crime was traditionally
subject to universal jurisdiction or, if not, was easily assimilable to such a crime. Air piracy
and aircraft sabotage are examples of the latter. See Hague Convention, done Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192; Convention for Civil Aviation (Sabotage), done Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. 7570. Multilateral cooperation has also been attempted at the
regional level, but it is as yet too early to gauge its effectiveness. See, e.g., European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1272
(1976) (signed by the plenipotentiaries of 17 member states of the Council of Europe on
January 27, 1977) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]; Organization of American
States Convention on Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. 8413, reprinted in 27 U.N. GAOR V
Annexes (Agenda Item 92) 1, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/418 (1972) [hereinafter cited as O.A.S.
Convention].
5. Apart from the difficulty of achieving international agreement on what constitutes
terrorism, is the problem of motivating a state to proceed against a terrorist. Despite the
protestations of many states that they condemn all terrorist activities, the truth is that such
condemnation is not always reflected in practice. For example, where a terrorist who is a
citizen of state A, carries out an attack in state B against the nationals of state C, and then
surfaces in state D, state D might prefer to avoid taking any action rather than prosecute
and lock up the terrorist on its own soil. State D might reasonably fear that it would be the
next target of an attack, this time to liberate the first terrorist. State D might also be
concerned that prosecuting the terrorist would poison relations with states sympathetic to
his cause. Such concerns, highlighted by the Abu Daoud case, show why the concept of
universal jurisdiction over acts of terrorism, even if it could be achieved on paper, might in
practice be only a partial solution.
6. A neutral state, as referred to in this Note, is a state where a terrorist has chosen either
to act or to seek refuge, but which itself is neither the ultimate target of the terrorist's acts
nor avowedly friendly to his cause.
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the means for overcoming these problems can be found within the bounds
of national legislation.
I
POLITICAL OBSTACLES-A CAVEAT
A possible drawback to any system of international criminal suppres-
sion keyed to the extradition process is that judicial decisions on whether
or not to extradite may not be binding on the politically influenced
executive branch.7 In most nations the judiciary's decision is final only
when the extradition request has been denied. Where the court has ruled
in favor of extradition, the executive branch has the power to reject the
decision and grant asylum. 8 In other countries the executive makes the
initial and final determination with the judiciary playing no role whatsoev-
er in the decision-making process. 9
This right of executive veto power is significant in. light of the great
extent to which the prosecution of terrorists is influenced by international
politics. Most terrorists seek haven in countries that they perceive as
friendly to their cause. In such countries, it is unlikely that even in the
complete absence of legal obstacles, a request for extradition would be
granted. The only exception would be where the decision on extradition
rested entirely in the hands of a judiciary independent of both the execu-
tive branch and popular political sentiment. Such systems are anything
but the norm.10
7. The present section deals with the politics of extradition, a topic not to be confused
with the political offenses exception. See notes 41-60 infra and accompanying text. The
executive, when seeking to justify a decision to grant asylum, could rely on the political
offenses exception; however, he is not limited to this basis. See I. SHEARER, ExTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198-99 (1971).
8. This system, commonly referred to as the Anglo-American system, is currently in use
in most countries of the world, including France, which had given its name to the alternative
system of exclusive executive control. See note 9 infra. See also J. LEMONTEY, DU R6LE DE
L'AUTORITE JUDICIARE DANS LA PROCEDURE D'EXTRADITION PASSIVE 54-61 (1966); I. SHEARER,
supra note 7, at 199-200.
Belgium is an example of a country where the judiciary's decisions on extradition, both
pro and con, are merely advisory. For an indication of the occasions on which the executive
has chosen to ignore the judiciary's advice, see Cochard, supra note 3, at 216-19.
9. This purely executive decision-making model was the system originally prevailing in
France. See, I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 198. In fact, the system has been referred to as the
French system. France adopted its present mix of judicial/executive decision-making in
Articles 10-18 of the Law of March 10, 1927, [1927] Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Frangaise [J.O.] 2874, [1927] Recueil Dalloz Piriodique et critique [D.P.] IV 265, unofficial
English translation in Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15,
380 (Supp. 1935). See generally J. LEMONTEY, supra note 8, at 44-53.
10. Shearer cites only one country, West Germany, where the judiciary is theoretically in
total control, and, even here, he notes that in practice the West German system functions
basically like the Anglo-American model. See I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 200.
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However, the situation is not as irremediable when the terrorist sur-
faces in a country less sympathetic to his activities, and less hostile to-or
perhaps neutral or friendly towards-the country which was the ultimate
target of his attack. Consider the case of Abu Daoud, the alleged perpe-
trator of an attack aimed at Israel who surfaced for a funeral in France, a
neutral country. When such a country receives an extradition request, it
is conceivable that despite the executive right of veto, the request would
be granted. The executive could argue that although he might not be
constitutionally bound to uphold the court's decision, he should,
nevertheless, show proper deference to the judiciary so as not to under-
mine respect for the country's legal institutions. By cloaking himself in
the law, he could temper the political ill-will that might be generated by
the decision to extradite in countries friendly to the terrorist's cause.
Thus, while political factors could prove to be a major problem in certain
cases, many instances could still be envisaged where the political element
would not constitute an insurmountable barrier to extradition.
II
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO EXTRADITION
Assuming that political considerations will not preclude a legal determi-
nation, there are a number of juridical obstacles which must be overcome
before an extradition request will be granted." In the present context,
three requirements deserve special attention: (1) the need for jurisdiction
in the requesting state; (2) the need for jurisdiction in the requested state;
and (3) a determination by the requested state that the offense for which
extradition is being sought is not a "political offense."' 2
A. JURISDICTION IN THE REQUESTING STATE
Extradition makes little sense if the requesting state cannot proceed
against the alleged criminal. Therefore, the requested state must ascertain
whether the requesting state has sufficiently extended its scope of juris-
diction as to overcome this initial hurdle to extradition. A state which
fears that its citizens or interests may be subject to attack from terrorists
beyond the reaches of its borders will wish to extend its criminal juris-
1I. See generally Research in International Law, supra note 9.
12. An obvious fourth requirement has been left off the list, namely, a valid extradition
treaty. Although extradition may be possible in the absence of a treaty, see I. SHEARER,
supra note 7, at 27-33, reliance on treaties is the standard practice. In the following
discussion it will be assumed that there is an extradition treaty in force between the
requested and requesting states.
BRINGING THE TERRORIST TO JUSTICE
diction beyond the scope of mere subjective territoriality.13 Objective
territoriality 14 might provide some help, especially if given a liberal read-
ing, but a more effective approach would be to base jurisdiction on the
protective and passive personality principles. 15
1. Protective Principle
The protective principle grants jurisdiction over crimes committed
outside of a state's territory which threaten the state's security, institu-
tions, or national interests. It is based on the notion that since a state
would have no real interest in sanctioning the activities of an individual
who, while inside that state, impaired the security or injured the institu-
tions of another state, that other state should be able to act on its own
behalf. 6 For instance, there is no reason why Belgium should be expect-
ed to have laws prohibiting the counterfeiting of French money on Bel-
gian soil by the nationals of a third state. Yet, such activities would injure
France. If French criminal law did not permit prosecution in such a case,
13. This process might immediately give rise to concern over the extent to which one
state should delve into the laws of another. See F. PIGoar, EXTRADmON 229 (1910). In
most civil law countries the requesting state is not examined extensively by the requested
state. Submission by the requesting state of the proper documents--arrest warrant, state-
ment of charges, and copy of the law under which it asserts jurisdiction- will normally be
sufficient. See S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 141-42 (1966).
Common law states may require the requesting state to provide evidence establishing a
prima facie case. Id. at 142-43; accord, Research in International Law, supra note 9, at 163.
But in neither case does the requested state pass judgment on whether it believes the
jurisdiction of the requesting state to be justified. 4 M. TRAvERs, LE DROIT PENAL INTERNA-
TIONAL 689, 696-97 (1921). The issue is strictly whether or not the requesting state's criminal
jurisdiction encompasses the act in question.
14. Territorial jurisdiction is the fundamental basis for jurisdiction in international law. It
is based on the view that "a state is competent to deal with any offense committed within its
territory, without regard to the nationality of the offender." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 299 (6th ed. 1963).
Territorial jurisdi~tion has been subdivided into subjective and objective territoriality.
Under subjective territoriality the criminal would have to be corporeally present within the
state at the time of the crime for that nation to have jurisdiction. Objective territoriality, on
the other hand, grants a nation jurisdiction over acts which have effects in that state
regardless of where the acts took place. Id. at 299-301. See generally Bassiouni, Theories of
Jurisdiction and their Application in Extradition Law and Practice, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1
(1974); Feller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in II A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nauda eds. 1973); Research in
International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935);
Schultz, Compitence des juridictions pinales pour les infractions commises h l'dtranger, 22
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 305 (1967).
15. This proposal is not one of pure abstraction, but is being given serious consideration
by Ireland, a country immediately concerned with the problem of terrorism. See Costello,
International Terrorism and the Development ofthePrinciple "Aut Dedere autJudicare," 10
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483, 497-98 (1975).
16. See H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, TRArI ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 968-69
(1938). See generally Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and
Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 567, 578-83 (1958).
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then, in all likelihood, the counterfeiters would be able to proceed secure
from all fear of punishment.17
Two relatively recent pieces of legislation illustrate some of the advan-
tages and pitfalls of using the protective principle to assert jurisdiction
over terrorist acts committed abroad. The principle's potential for abuse
was highlighted by the 1972 amendment to the Israeli penal law on
offenses committed abroad.18 The amendment gave the Israeli courts the
competence "to try under Israeli law a person who has committed abroad
an act which would be an offense if it had been committed in Israel and
which harmed or was intended to harm the State of Israel, its security,
property or economy . "...19 In 1973, proceeding under this law, the
Israeli authorities tried before a military court a Turkish national captured
in Lebanon who was allegedly a member of Al Fatah. 20 This alleged
membership was the extent of his crime. 21 Conceivably, if the Turk in
17. It is precisely such cases as counterfeiting, forging entry papers, and giving false
statements on immigration applications which have proved the most widely accepted in-
stances for application of protective jurisdiction. Even the American courts, which are
generally opposed to the protective principle, have been willing to give it effect in these
areas. 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 903-04 (1965). Nevertheless, the American
courts have often preferred to view their competence in terms of an expansively interpreted
objective territoriality, rather than invoke the protective principle. See Strassheim v. Daily,
221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). See generally United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal.
1960), aff'd in part sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 948 (1961). By whatever name, the protective principle in this limited sense causes
few states any real difficulty.
Problems arise, however, where states seek to expand the protective principle beyond
forgery and counterfeiting to acts which injure state security. Since it would be for each
state to define security as it wished, the principle is seen by some as far too open-ended and
thus laden with risks. See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, supra note 16, at 586-87.
It could be argued that individual freedom would be seriously curtailed if citizens in one
state were subject to liability in another state because remarks uttered in the former were
regarded by the latter as somehow injurious to the latter's security. While such concerns are
not to be discounted, they do not justify a total rejection of the protective principle. A state
wishing to expand its protective jurisdiction to cover terrorist offenses, but not other acts
that conceivably could be deemed as threatening its sectirity, should be able to draft
legislation accordingly.
Whatever the misgivings of common law countries, there appears to be no rule of
international law requiring a restriction on the exercise of the protective principle. Garcia-
Mora, supra note 16, at 587. Article 7 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime includes a clause which limits the principle's applicability, but the accompanying
comment admits that this restriction was designed to change rather than codify existing
law. See Research in International Law, supra note 14, at 543, 557.
18. Law of 6th Nisan, 5732 (March 21, 1972), Penal Law Amendment (Offences Commit-
ted Abroad) (Amendment No. 4), [5732 (1972)] Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 651, at 52 (Israel),
authorized translation in 26 Laws of State of Israel 53 (5732-197172).
19. Id. sec. 3(l), § 2(a).
20. Judgment of Aug. 7, 1973, Military Court, Lod, Israel. See Note, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in
International Law, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1087 (1974).
21. A critique of this far-reaching exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be found in
id. at 1100-03.
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question had not been captured by Israel but rather had been made the
subject of an Israeli extradition request, the necessary safeguards against
his rendition probably would have been available either in the form of an
executive grant of asylum22 or the judicial adoption of the political of-
fense exception.23 Still, it is just such an overly broad exertion of criminal
jurisdiction which serves to reinforce skepticism as to the propriety of the
protective principle, thereby hindering its adoption in situations where it
would be not only useful, but entirely justified.
More promising is the 1975 amendment to the French penal code24
which was adopted in response to the terrorist attack the year before
against the French Embassy in The Hague. 25 The text, with the new
language italicized, now provides that:
Every foreigner who outside the territory of the Republic renders him-
self guilty, either as perpetrator or as accomplice, of a felony or misde-
meanor against the security of the State. . . or of a felony against French
diplomatic or consular agents or offices may be prosecuted and tried
according to the provisions of French law if he is arrested in France or if
the Government obtains his extradition. 26
The amendment represents a good example of the proper use of the
protective principle.27 While it expands protective jurisdiction, it does so
in a clearly defined and limited fashion, focusing only on particular
targets of terrorist activity and establishing that the offense must be of a
minimum degree of gravity, namely, a felony.
Prior to the" 1975 amendment France might have been unable to suc-
22. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 41-60 infra and acpompanying text.
24. Law of July 11, .1975, Law No. 75-624, arts. 10-14, [1975] J.O. 7220, [1975] Dalloz-
Sirey, LUgislation [D.S.L.] 261 (France).
25. For the factual background to the attack in The Hague, see the following issues of the
New York Times: Sept. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 4; Sept. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 4; Sept. 16, 1974, at 1,
col. 1; Sept.. 17, 1974, at 3, col. I; Sept. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 7.
Mr. Gerbet, Rapporteur of the National Assembly Committee which examined the 1975
French Penal Law Amendment referred in his report to the need to intensify the repression
of terrorists. I ASSEMBLiE NATIONALE REP. No. 1616, 5th Legis., 2d Sess. Ordinaire 2, 20
(1975) (France). Mr. Lecanuet, Minister of Justice, referred specifically to the incidents at
The Hague when he spoke in favor of the legislation during both the Assembly and Senate
debates. [1975] J.O. DEBATS PARLEMENTAIRES, ASSEMBLiE NATIONALE 2745; [1975] J.O.
DiBATS PARLEMENTAIRES, SiNAT 1713.
26. Law of July 11, 1975, Law No. 75-624, art. 13, [1975] J.O. 7220, [1975] D.S.L. 261
(English translation of prior text from THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 215 (G.
Kock trans. 1964), English translation of new text by the author).
27. If a criticism were to be made, it might be that the statute is too narrowly drawn.
Terrorists can be expected to commit acts against persons other than diplomatic personnel.
However, passive personality jurisdiction could be invoked to fill any gaps. See notes 28-32
infra and accompanying text. The wisest course is not to create so broad a scan. of
protective jurisdiction as to discredit the principle among the members of the world commu-
nity.
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cessfully request the extradition of terrorists who committed crimes such
as those involved in the incident at The Hague. Reliance would have had
to have been placed on prosecution by a foreign state which for numerous
reasons might fear imprisoning the terrorist on its soil. By adopting
protective jurisdiction over this type of crime and broadening the scope
of its criminal jurisdiction, France has closed this loophole. In so doing,
France has strengthened its own security, enabled the requested state to
disdain prosecution without risk of international opprobrium, and, most
importantly, made it less likely that such terrorists will go free.
2. Passive Personality
The passive personality principle gives a state jurisdiction over acts
against its nationals wherever those acts take place. Despite a long his-
tory28 and a fairly broad-based modern acceptance, especially in civil law
countries, 29 the principle has been subject to much criticism.30 This criti-
28. H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note 16, at 977.
29. By the time of the Harvard Draft, the passive personality principle had been adopted
by "an important group of states." Research in International Law, supra note 14, at 578.
See also Feller, supra note 14, at 29 n.22; Schultz, supra note 14, at 318-20. Israel adopted
passive personality jurisdiction in 1972 through its amendment to the Offences Committed
Abroad Law. Law of 6th Nisan, 5732 (March 21, 1972), Penal Law Amendment (Offences
Committed Abroad) (Amendment No. 4), [5732 (1972)] Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 651, at 52
(Israel).
In perhaps the most important recent development, France adopted the principle in its
July i1, 1975 amendments to the penal law. Law of July 11, 1975, Law No. 75-624, Title II,
[1975] J.O. 7220, [1975] D.S.L. 261. The adoption of passive personality jurisdiction repre-
sented a major reversal in French thinking. As the Socialist Deputy Jean Pierre Cot was
quick to point out during the Assembly floor debate, France was the country that had argued
against such jurisdiction in the famous case of The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.
10, at 22. The response of Jean Foyer, Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Laws
(which had supported the Code revision), was to remind Cot that France had lost the Lotus
case. [1975] J.O. DiBATS PARLEMENTAIRES, ASSEMBLgE NATIONALE 2763. To say that Cot's
arguments may have fallen on deaf ears seems too generous. The truth is that they fell on
virtually no ears at all. This major revision in the French Penal Law was adopted inia late-
night session just before a major holiday weekend, with only a smattering of deputies
present in the chamber. Id. at 2754.
30. The -United States vehemently condemned the passive personality principle in The
Cutting Incident. U.S. Dep't of State, [1887] FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
751. The case involved an American citizen, A.K. Cutting, who had been incarcerated in
Mexico for publishing a newspaper story in Texas that allegedly libeled a Mexican citizen. A
Mexican criminal statute had accorded the Mexican courts passive personality jurisdiction.
The dissenting opinions and separate opinion in The S.S. Lotus also questioned the
soundness of the passive personality principle. The Lotus majority, however, did no more
than reserve its opinion on the matter. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 22-
23. Since the Lotus case remains the only principal international decision on this question,
the validity of the passive personality principle can only be assessed in the light of national
attitudes and scholarly writings. The practice among nations has been mixed. A number of
countries, and by no means unimportant ones, have now approved the principle. See Feller,
supra note 14, at 29, n.22; Schultz, supra note 14, at 318-20. Others, especially the
BRINGING THE TERRORIST TO JUSTICE
cism, though perhaps possessing some merit in a generalized context, 31 is
much less solidly grounded in the context of terrorism.
Concededly, passive personality, if given sweeping coverage, carries a
potential for abuse. A person dealing with a foreign national might face
entirely unforeseen risks of liability in the foreign state. But, if imple-
mented with a direct and limited purpose, namely securing the safety of
one's citizens from terrorist acts abroad, the risk of abuse would be
minimized. For, while it may be too much to expect the average citizen to
be familiar with all of the criminal laws of every country, it is not
unrealistic to assume he would realize that committing a terrorist act
might subject him to foreign prosecution.
Passive personality could prove to be a useful tool in the prosecution of
terrorism and a necessary complement to the protective principle. For
example, where a state A terrorist kidnapped and held hostage in state B
a businessman of state C, the protective principle, even in the modified
French form, might not prove effective. 32 If state B were a neutral state,
unprepared to prosecute but ready to extradite, the existence of criminal
jurisdiction in state C over the state A terrorist could prove crucial to the
granting of extradition. Passive personality would provide such juris-
diction. State C, by adopting passive personality jurisdiction, would
reinforce the protection it is able to guarantee for its nationals, ease the
pressures on state B, and, as with the protective principle, help bring the
terrorist to justice.
Thus the first legal obstacle to extradition, jurisdiction in the state
making the extradition request, can be surmounted. Potential requesting
states may meet this requirement with little difficulty if they undertake a
territorially oriented common law countries, including the United States, persist in rejecting
it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (2),
Comment (e)(1965). The commentators also tend to oppose the application of the principle.
See, e.g., H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note 16, at 978; Bassiouni, supra note 14, at44;
Sahovic & Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places,
in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 374 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
31. The opposition is not unlike that voiced against the protective principle. See Note,
supra note 20, at 1100-03. The same fear is present, namely that a person in state A, while
obeying all the laws of that state, may be subject to criminal liability in state B. Under the
protective principle, this could result from actions in state A which state B deemed harmful
to its security. Under passive personality, liability could stem from simple violations of state
B's criminal code which cause injury to state B citizens. In both instances, the person in
state A would be required to know and follow the laws of a state other than that of his
residence.
32. See Law of July 11, 1975, Law No. 75-624, art. 13, [1975] J.O. 7219, [1975] D.S.L. 261
(limiting jurisdiction to felonies against French diplomatic or consular agents or offices).
But see Law of 6th Nisan, 5732 (March 21, 1972), Penal Law Amendment (Offences
Committed Abroad) (Amendment No. 4), Sec. 3(1), § 2(a) [5732 (1972)] Sefer Ha-Chukkim
4o. 651, at 52 (Israel) (providing that protective jurisdiction may be based on economic
injury).
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careful and controlled expansion of their criminal jurisdiction through the
adoption of the protective and passive personality principles.
B. JURISDICTION IN THE REQUESTED STATE - DOUBLE CRIMINALITY
For an offense to be extraditable most treaties require that it be a crime
of a specified degree in both the requested and requesting state.33 This
element, often referred to as the double criminality principle, 34 "serves
the most important function of ensuring that a person's liberty is not
restricted as a consequence of offenses not recognized as criminal by the
requested State." 35 In addition, the requested state is not put in the
awkward position of extraditing a person who would not be subject to
punishment under its own laws. 36
Because the double criminality requirement involves the interpretation
of the laws of the requested state, that state is deemed to have the
exclusive authority to judge whether this element has been satisfied. In
the Abu Daoud case,37 the French court relied upon Article 3 of the Law
of March 10, 1927,38 which incorporated into French law one aspect of the
double criminality requirement. The law provided that in the case of
crimes committed abroad by non-French nationals, extradition could be
granted only where the criminal was subject to prosecution under French
law. 39 The court implied that the 1975 French Penal Law Amendment
would have authorized prosecution of Daoud if it had been enacted prior
to the events in Munich. However, since the 1975 Amendments were not
retroactive, Daoud's acts were not crimes under French law and extradi-
tion was not possible.40 Thus, because of the limited jurisdictional reach
of France in 1972, the prosecutorial competence of requesting states was
greatly restricted.
All such loopholes in the international criminal justice system ought to
be closed. While revision of treaties might be one road to a solution,
33. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Nov. 12, 1958, France-Israel, art. 2, para. 1,
ratified Nov. 16, 1971, [1971] J.O. 11268.
34. See generally I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 137-41.
35. Id. at 137.
36. Id. This rationale is open to challenge since a state may have excellent reasons for
regarding certain acts as criminal-reasons that do not obtain in other national settings. M.
TRAVERS, supra note 13, at 655-57. In such circumstances, there seems to be little justifica-
tion for letting the requested state thwart the requesting state's criminal process. For
instance, most coastal states have legal regimes geared to protect maritime interests. A
violator of the coastal state's criminal law seeking refuge in a non-coastal state might be
secure from extradition unless the relevant treaty expressly covered such crimes.
37. The Abu Daoud case, supra note 1.
38. [1927] J.O. 2874, [1927] D.P. IV 265.
39. Id. art. 3.
40. The Abu Daoud case, supra note 1.
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international negotiation can be a complex and cumbersome process. The
better path would be for states to expand, or at least liberally interpret,
their own powers of criminal jurisdiction so as to remove the stumbling'
block of double criminality. Just as expanded jurisdiction under the
protective or passive personality principles would help overcome the first
legal obstacle to extradition, competence of the requesting state, it would
also help overcome the second obstacle, jurisdiction in the requested
state.
C. THE POLITICAL OFFENSES EXCEPTION
The political offender was originally the prime candidate for extradi-
tion. 4' Indeed, throughout much of the history of extradition law, the
common criminal was generally ignored. However, during the 19th cen-
tury the common criminal became the main target of extradition and
political offenders the exception. 42
France, the most prolific maker of extradition treaties in the 19th
century, was the country most responsible for the rapid growth of the
political offenses exception. 43 Beginning with their 1834 treaty with Bel-
gium, virtually all French agreements incorporated an exception for polit-
ical offenses. 44 These treaties, however, did not include any explanation
of the exception's scope and purpose. Nor was there any legislation to fill
the vacuum. The French precedent of simply setting forth the exception,
without guidance as to its meaning, has been widely followed to the
present day. 45 As a result, "it has been left to the courts, to executive
authorities and to commentators to put flesh upon these meagre bones. '" 46
The executive authorities have tended to tailor the exception on a case
41. Research in International Law, supra note 9, at 108; I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 166-
67; see id. at 56-57.
42. Research in International Law, supra note 9, at 108. The Harvard Draft on Extradi-
tion credits the change to two factors: "(1) the evolution of political institutions following
the French Revolution; [and] (2) the growing consciousness of the interdependence of
nations following the Industrial Revolution." The first factor explains the decreasing will-
ingness of states to return political criminals. As more countries escaped from the domi-
nance of aristocratic rulers and moved toward democracy, the idea of returning the "propo-
nents of liberalism" to suffer at the hands of a tyrant became increasingly distasteful.
Emphasis was placed on the need to grant asylum rather than on the duty to grant extradi-
tion. The second factor accounts for the rising interest in sanctioning the common criminal.
Thanks to improved means of travel and communication, countries began to view them-
selves as part of a community in which a certain degree of order should be maintained. Id. at
108-09.
43. See I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 16-19.
44. Id. at 167.
45. Articles I and 2 of the European Convention, supra note 4, marked a break with
tradition. By laying down a list of specific exceptions to the political offenses exception,
they provide the kind of guidance previously lacking in this area.
46. See I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 168-69.
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by case basis to fit the prevailing political climate or their own sense of
justice. The courts and commentators have attempted to be more sys-
tematic and have established two broad categories of political crimes: the
pure political offense and the relative political offense. 47 The former is an
act directed solely against the political order'8 and therefore does not
involve any of the elements of a common crime. The printing of subver-
sive literature falls into this category, as does mere membership in a
subversive group. The relative political offense, on the other hand, in-
volves a common crime with political overtones. Murder for political
purposes is the clearest illustration.
There is general agreement among the courts and commentators that
the pure political offender falls within the exception to extradition. 49 The
much more common relative political offense, however, is the object of
considerable debate. The English courts have read the political offenses
exception broadly enough to bring in relative offenses. 50 The American
courts have taken a similar view.5' The Swiss Federal Tribunal in the case
of In re Pavan52 developed a narrower interpretation of the exception.
Under the Swiss theory of "predominance," the exception is limited to
crimes of a predominantly political character. 53 The criminal action must
be "immediately connected with its political object," and the damage
caused must not be out of proportion to the desired result. 54
The Swiss theory of predominance was reaffirmed in Ktir v. Minist~re
Public Fdifial.55 The case involved the alleged political assassination of
an Algerian citizen on French soil by Ktir, a French citizen of Algeria and
a member of the FLN.56 Following Ktir's arrest in Switzerland, the
French requested his extradition pursuant to the Franco-Swiss extradi-
47. See generally Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses
Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE
PAUL L. REV. 217, 245-54 (1969). Latin American and European courts and commentators
further subdivide relative offenses into the "d61it complexe" and the "dlit connexe." See
I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 181-83. This distinction is not essential to the present discus-
sion.
48. See Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 245.
49. See I. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 182.
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 178-79.
52. Judgment of June 15, 1928, Bundesgericht, Switz., 54 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerisches Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BGE] 1 207, 54 Arrats du Tribunal
f6d6ral suisse, Recueil officiel [ATF] 1 207, [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l L. Cases 347
(unofficial translation).
53. See id. at 213-15, 54 ATF at 213-15, [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l L. Cases at 348-
49.
54. Id.
55. Judgment of May 17, 1961, Bundesgericht, Switz., 87 BGE 1 134, 87 ATF 1 134, 34
Int'l L. Rep. 143 (unofficial translation).
56. Front de lib6ration nationale.
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tion treaty of 1869, 57 a treaty containing a political offenses exception.58
The Swiss Tribunal granted the French request. After conceding that the
FLN was engaged in a struggle manifestly political in character, and that
Ktir acted out-of political and not personal motives, the Tribunal stated:
It does not, however, follow that the act had a predominantly political
character. For this to be the case it is necessary that the murder of Mezai
should have been the sole means of safeguarding the more important
interests of the F.L.N. and of attaining the political aim of that organiza-
tion. That is not so.
9
In light of Ktir, there is ample basis for arguing that the political
offenses exception, even in the case of so politically motivated an offend-
er as the terrorist, is not an insurmountable barrier to extradition.6
III
PROPOSALS
The major legal obstacles to the extradition of terrorists can be over-
come or avoided through the controlled and focused expansion of juris-
diction.6 The principal goal, therefore, should be for states to legislative-
ly adopt the protective and passive personality principles. As to passive
personality, this should not be done on so broad a scale as the French law
of 1975.62 Rather, safeguards should be included to restrict the reach of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts of terrorism.
Admittedly, the unilateral expansion of criminal jurisdiction is an indi-
rect approach to the problem of extradition. Nevertheless, it could prove
to be the most effective way to deal with the problem. It leaves the
resolution of the problem at the domestic law level where lack of interna-
tional consensus need not constitute a barrier to positive action. By
helping itself-that is, by expanding its jurisdiction and thereby increas-
ing the protection of its interests and its nationals abroad-a country
helps potehtial requesting countries as well, thereby strengthening the
international criminal justice system as a whole.
Beyond the expansion of jurisdiction, the legislature should promulgate
rules or guidelines to aid the judiciary in its interpretation of extradition
57. Treaty on Extradition, July 9, 1869, France-Switzerland, [1870] D.P. IV 18.
58. Id. art. 2.
59. 87 BGE I at 138-39, 87 ATF I at 138-39, 34 Int'l L. Rep. at 145.
60. Dugard, Towards the Definition of International Terrorism, 67 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PRoc. 94, 97-98 (1973).
61. Admittedly, the political obstacles may remain. See notes 7-10 supra and accompany-
ing text. Some of the proposals offered in this section may help overcome this problem.
62. See European Convention, supra note 4, art. 1; O.A.S. Convention, supra note 4,
art. 2.
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matters. A legislative policy of liberal interpretation of double criminality
provisions in extradition treaties and legislative guidance as to the mean-
ing of "political offense" would be helpful.
Where constitutionally feasible, the legislature should adopt rules
clearly delineating the powers of the executive and judicial branches over
extradition. Preferably, the role of the generally less politically sensitive
judiciary should be increased. A shift to increased judicial control should
not be effected in a legislative vacuum but should be accompanied by
legislative guidelines on the exercise of that authority. Giving the
judiciary exclusive control over extradition or making all executive deci-
sions subject to review would foster more systematic treatment of extra-
dition requests.
The domestic law approach need not be regarded as exclusive. States
should continue to explore the possibilities of achieving solutions on a
bilateral or multilateral plane. In particular the problem of defining the
political offenses exception to exclude terrorists could be resolved
through the revision of extradition treaties.
CONCLUSION
The present system of international criminal law must be viewed as
patently flawed when it allows an alleged terrorist such as Abu Daoud to
escape prosecution. But, through careful modification of both extradition
agreements and national legislation, these flaws can be remedied. Fur-
thermore, the modifications suggested may produce other benefits as
well. The greater certainty of prosecution should provide a limited degree
of deterrence. Also, a target country will no longer be faced with the
choice of either striking back with force or remaining helpless. A judicial
means of subduing the attackers will be available. Most importantly, as
more terrorists are prosecuted, the feeling will grow that there does exist
an international legal order and that terrorism has no place in it.
Total reform will take years, and the caprices of international politics
will always be a factor with which to contend. However, if states are
genuinely interested in thwarting the international terrorist, the domestic
law approach provides a workable first step.
Jeffrey B. Gaynes
